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Chapter 1
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY
1 1. .   T Th he e   c cu ur rr re en nt t   s si it tu ua at ti io on n   a an nd d   t th he e   m ma ac cr ro oe ec co on no om mi ic c   
o ou ut tl lo oo ok k   
After a deep economic recession during the winter of
2008/2009, which was triggered by a US-led financial
crisis, many countries went through a stabilisation
period and now seem to have entered a recovery phase.
Global monetary and fiscal policies have prevented a
worse outcome and lie at the roots of the current
recovery. Furthermore, the search for liquidity during
the crisis has created an inventory cycle which will also
drive growth for the time being.1 However, the restruc-
turing process within the banking sector is far from
being completed and the too low national saving rate
in the US has not reached structurally sustainable lev-
els yet. Consequently, the fading out of fiscal and
monetary stimulus measures this year will likely leave
the world economy struggling to achieve growth in the
years to come. Relatively sound economic conditions
allow emerging countries to witness a revival of their
economies. Their domestic economies will remain the
growth engines for the world economy.
Although the roots of the crisis lie in the US, of the
larger economic regions, Japan and the European
Union suffered the most. This can partly be ex-
plained by the much more pro-
nounced economic policy reac-
tions of US officials and partly
by the sharp correction in global
imbalances. The US trade ac-
count improved substantially,
exporting part of its problems to
the rest of the world. On the
other hand, Japan and Europe
saw a clear deterioration of their
external balance and thereby
acted – together with many
emerging markets – as shock
absorbers for the world.
The European economy will only temporarily expe-
rience somewhat higher growth. Although business
prospects of firms have improved, problems within
the banking sector remain. This will lead to a more
restrictive credit supply which, together with contin-
ued underutilisation of production factors, will sup-
press especially investments. Worsening labour mar-
ket conditions, small wage increases and somewhat
higher inflation will lead to a reduction in real dis-
posable income, thereby reducing consumption
growth. Overall growth will remain subdued at least
this year. 
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1.1.1 The global economy
The world economy seems to have overcome its
worst recession since the World War II. World trade
and industrial production having collapsed during
winter 2008/2009, both have started to pick up again
more recently (see Figure 1.1). Besides massive fiscal
stimulus packages and expansionary monetary poli-
cy, this process is supported by a still comparatively
low oil price and a turnaround in the worldwide
inventory cycle.
According to the Ifo World Economic Survey, the
world economic climate indicator rose in the fourth
1 When discussing the cyclical situation in
the European Union in Section 1.3.6, we
clarify what is meant by the inventory
cycle.
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gure 1.2). This was its third con-
secutive increase. The two under-
lying components of the Ifo eco-
nomic climate indicator, i.e. the
current assessment and the
expectations for the next six
months, tend to move in a clock-
wise manner over the business
cycle (see Figure 1.3). As of late,
the increase of the overall indica-
tor not only resulted from more
favourable expectations for the
next six months, but increasingly
also from less negative appraisals
of the present economic situa-
tion. Nevertheless, the current
economic situation is still as-
sessed as worse than it was after
the attack on the World Trade
Center in 2001.
The improvement of the current
economic situation took place in
all major regions in the world.
Especially the assessments in
Asia are noteworthy. Not only
did that region recover first, but it
also has seen the largest improve-
ment in this sentiment indicator
since the onset of the crisis. In
Western Europe and North
America, the assessment of the
current economic situation only
improved slightly and remained
at historically unfavourable levels
in the fourth quarter of 2009 (see
Figure 1.4). 
After having fluctuated steadily
around 2 percent since the mid-
1990s, inflation in the advanced
countries strongly picked up to
well above 4 percent in summer
2008 before subsequently drop-
ping to – 1.3 percent in July last
year. Besides the economic up-
swing up until mid-2008 and the
economic crisis afterwards, main-
ly oil and other raw material price
have caused these strong fluctua-
tions in inflation rates (see Fi-
gure 1.5). Whereas the oil price
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peaked at around 130 US dollars per barrel in sum-
mer 2008, it fell to about 40 US dollars in winter
2008/2009. This winter it is fluctuating around 75 US
dollars again. 
1.1.2 United States
In the US the deepest recession since the World War
II has come to an end in the third quarter of 2009.
With an annualised increase in GDP of 2.2 percent in
the third and even 5.7 percent in the fourth quater the
overall economic dynamism was as high as last seen
two years ago. Nevertheless, due to the sharp decline
during the winter of 2008/2009, GDP in 2009 ended
up 2.4 percent lower than in 2008 (see Table A.1). 
In particular, a strong increase in private consumption
was responsible for the positive
development in the third quarter
of last year. Private consumption
expanded by 2.8 percent. Its con-
tribution to overall growth was
2 percentage points – the biggest
among all demand side compo-
nents (see Figure 1.6). The in-
crease in private consumption
was largely driven by the sharp
rise in public transfer payments
as part of the government stimu-
lus packages. In particular, the
“Cash for Clunkers” program,
which ran in summer, temporari-
ly led to a substantial increase in
car sales and thereby can explain
around half of the GDP increase
in the third quarter. With the pro-
gram running out at the end of
August, car sales broke down
again. The uplift in private con-
sumption in the third quarter can
only partly compensate for its
loss throughout the year; private
consumption overall fell by 
– 0.6 percent in 2009. 
The private saving rate has been
steadily increasing from 1.2 per-
cent of disposable income in the
first quarter of 2008 to up to
5.4 percent in the second quarter
of 2009, before it subsequently
fell somewhat to 4.5 percent in
the third quarter. 
This pattern is also apparent in the falling credits
granted to households, in particular in the area of
credit cards. Despite these developments, the share
of consumption in GDP rose substantially in 2009.
Whereas the consumption share hovered around
62 percent in the 1960s and 1970s, moved up to
67 percent in the 1990s, and increased to about
70 percent in the 2000s, it has even surpassed 71 per-
cent in the third quarter of 2009 and thereby
reached its highest level at least since World War II
(see Figure 1.6). 
The strongest negative growth contribution last year
came from investment (see Figure 1.7). Gross fixed
capital formation plummeted by around 18 percent;
when including the sharp drop in inventories, the
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tion even fell by close to 24 per-
cent. Quite different from 2008,
this decline in investment was
more or less similar across its
different components. Whereas
in 2007 and in 2008 only resi-
dential investment put a burden
on total investment, investment
in non-residential structures
and equipment and software
took a similar blow last year as
did residential investment. The
turn in the inventory cycle
allowed total investment growth
to turn positive again in partic-
ular during the fourth quarter
of last year. Investment in
equipment and software, which
accounts for more than half of total investments, no
longer shrunk, but still remained weak. In partic-
ular, the extremely low capacity utilisation rate in
industry is responsibly for this. Although capacity
utilisation reached its trough in June last year with
68.3 percent, it remains, with 71.3 percent in No-
vember, at a historically low level (its long-run aver-
age equals 81.1 percent). For basically the same rea-
son, non-residential construction investment is still
reporting substantial negative growth (an annu-
alised – 15.4 percent in the fourth quarter). The only
component of gross fixed capital formation that
appears to have bounced back is residential invest-
ment. After 14 quarters of strong negative growth, it
contributed for the first time positively to US
growth again and rose with an annualised 18.9 per-
cent in the third quarter. 
The domestic problems led to a
sharp fall in the demand for for-
eign goods and services over the
year. The fall in exports on the
other hand was clearly less pro-
nounced. Consequently, the US
trade balance was able to im-
prove substantially last year; its
contribution to GDP growth
was approximately one percent-
age point. In that sense, the US
economy was able to partly ex-
port its domestic crisis to the
rest of the world and in that
way contributed towards reduc-
ing global imbalances. As com-
pared to the pre-crisis period (2007QI–2008QI), it
was able to improve its trade balance by around 2.5
percentage points (see Figure 1.8). On the absorb-
ing end of this shock stood, amongst others, Japan
and the euro area. Looking at exports and imports
individually, after having fallen for respectively 4
and 7 quarters in a row, both made a sharp turn-
around in the third quarter of last year.
Due to the economic crisis, the unemployment rate
in the US has doubled from 5 percent in spring 2008
up to 10 percent in autumn last year, the highest rate
since 1983 (see Figure 1.9). The business cycle recov-
ery so far has hardly led to a relief on the labour
market. The number of employees continued to de-
crease up until the end of last year, albeit at a slow-
er pace.
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After eight months of negative inflation, the price
level started to increase again in November relative to
the year before. The inflation development was deter-
mined above all by the recovery of energy and raw
material prices. Nevertheless, the increase in the core
index for personal consumption expenditure – which
is the preferred inflation measure of the Federal
Reserve – remained in October last year, with 1.4 per-
cent, at a low level.
After approximately three years, real-estate prices
stopped falling in mid-2009. Since its peak in spring
2006, house prices fell by more than 30 percent. Since
summer last year, some moderate price increases have
been observed. To a large extent, this development
can be traced back to the massive subsidies and tax
reliefs of the US government. During the fiscal year
2009, the fiscal support to the real-estate market, for
instance the First-Time Home Buyer Credit, added up
to about 300 billion US dollars. Only when state sup-
port runs out, however, will it be possible to judge
whether the recovery on the real-estate market will
remain sustainable. A continuation of the drop in
real-estate prices would lead to additional write-offs
on mortgage-backed securities and again endanger
the stability of the banking system.
Since early summer, the interbank market increasing-
ly shows signs of relaxation. The risk premia banks
have to pay to get unsecured money, as measured by
the difference between the 3-month LIBOR Euro-
dollar rate and the Federal Reserve’s Fed Fund rate, at
the end of last year reached a pre-crisis level of
10 basis points again. Consequently, the Federal Re-
serve has started drawing back its liquidity support
continuously. Nevertheless, as a
result of increasing its massive
intervention programs to lower
long-term lending rates, in partic-
ular for mortgages, its balance
sheet is still expanding further.
Furthermore, whereas the Fed-
eral Reserve in October of last
year stopped purchasing US gov-
ernment bonds, it still continues
to buy bonds of state-owned
mortgage suppliers and mort-
gage-backed securities during the
first quarter of this year.
Supported by the extensive mea-
sures of the Federal Reserve,
mortgage interest rates have
clearly fallen since the end of 2008. Accordingly, since
the second quarter of 2009, banks have started to reg-
ister an increase in the number of mortgage loan
applications. Nevertheless, on account of the high
unemployment rate and the rising loan failure rates,
banks remain reluctant to grant these requests. In
spite of improved conditions on the interbank mar-
ket, the climax in loan failures has not yet been
reached. This will put further strains on the capital
base of the banking system.
The US government budget registered a record deficit
in 2009. At the end of the fiscal year in September the
budget deficit amounted to 1.4 trillion US dollars or
9.9 percent of GDP (as compared to 3.2 percent in fis-
cal 2008) and thereby reached its highest level since
1945. The increase is just as much due to a decline in
revenues as to an increase in expenses. On the expen-
diture side, especially spending to rescue banks
(TARP) and the financial support for the state-owned
mortgage suppliers stand out. The stimulus package
(ARRA), which was decided in February last year, is
a burden to both the expenditure as well as the rev-
enue side. 
1.1.3 Japan, China, India and other Asian countries
After having been hit the hardest amongst the large
economies in the world during winter 2008/2009, the
economic recovery in Japan set in already in the sec-
ond quarter of last year. Nevertheless, with modest
annualised growth rates of 2.7 and 1.3 percent in the
second and third quarters, respectively, only part of
the more than 10 percent annualised drop during the
winter could be made up for. The most important dri-
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vate consumption. Favoured by the strong increase of
exports, the growth contribution of net exports to
GDP growth mounted to 6.1 percentage points in the
second quarter and to 3.0 percentage points in the
third quarter. Private consumption increased by an
annualised 4.8 and 3.8 percent in respectively the sec-
ond and third quarter. On the other hand, invest-
ments continued to fall at double-digit rates through-
out the year. 
The favourable developments since the second quar-
ter of last year have likely continued throughout the
rest of last year. Although no quarterly national
accounts statistics for the fourth quarter of last year
are available at the time of writing, other economic
data point in this direction. Here especially the
results of the Tankan business tendency survey,
according to which the business and profit situation
of Japanese manufacturers have further improved,
are to be mentioned. However, also at current levels,
the indicators are still at historically low levels. This
matches the positive developments in industrial pro-
duction, which has meanwhile risen seven months in
a row, but remains well below its long-run average.
The recovery is not only felt by industry, but is also
reflected by indexes on developments in the service
sector and in the economy as a whole, which have
improved strongly. In addition, consumer sentiment
surveys send out similar signals. Nevertheless, to a
large extent, these positive developments are based
upon government stimulus measures to promote in
particular purchases of durable consumption goods.
Hence, Japan is likely to show a further increase in
GDP in the fourth quarter of 2009. This can, howev-
er, not prevent the annual growth rate for 2009 from
falling to – 5.3 percent. 
The unemployment rate at the beginning of last year
still was still at about 4 percent, but it subsequently
rose sharply into the summer, reaching a peak of
5.7 percent in July due to the economic crisis. Ever
since, it has shown signs of a gradual decline again
reaching 5.1 percent in October last year. However,
according to survey results, firms are still planning
to cut back employment. Furthermore, part of this
positive development is caused by an increase in gov-
ernment subsidised employment. The unemploy-
ment rate is likely to be much higher without these
measures.
As the uncollateralised overnight call rate in Japan
hover around 0.1 percent since the end of 2008, leav-
ing hardly any room for manoeuvre, the Japanese cen-
tral bank has introduced a number of additional mea-
sures to stabilise the financial markets and to improve
the supply of credit to the economy. These include
buying up government and firm bonds as well as
stocks. 
To counteract the economic crisis, the Japanese gov-
ernment has introduced several economic stimulus
packages with a total volume of approximately 5 per-
cent of GDP. The associated additional spending
together with the cyclical reduction in revenues has
caused the budget deficit to increase to 8 percent of
GDP in 2009.
Over the summer China was able to return to nearly
pre-crisis growth levels. GDP grew by an annualised
7.9 and 8.9 percent in the second and third quarter of
last year, respectively. A comparison of the first three
quarters with those of 2008 reveals an impressive
growth rate of 7.7 percent. Therefore, it appears like-
ly that the self-assigned goal to achieve an annual
growth rate of about 8 percent in 2009 will nearly be
reached. We assume that it will amount to 7.8 percent
in 2009. To a large extent this performance is caused
by a strong increase in investment activity initiated by
huge fiscal and monetary stimulus programs of the
government. Besides stimulating private consump-
tion, the government stimulus programs above all
concentrated on investments in public infrastructure,
with a special focus on transport infrastructure, the
health sector and the underdeveloped western part of
the country.
The quick stimulus measures that fuelled imports of
commodities together with a hesitant stabilisation of
the world economy caused the trade surplus of China
to shrink during the first part of last year. During the
second half of last year also the revival of exports,
due to improved economic conditions around the
world as well as the weakness of the renminbi against
most currencies as a result of the weakness of the dol-
lar, the trade surplus has recovered and contributed
positively to economic growth. Although the Chinese
authorities allowed for a steady nominal appreciation
of the renminbi between July 2005 and July 2008, it
has since returned to close to a fixed exchange rate
vis-à-vis the US dollar.
After the favourable developments in the second and
third quarter of 2009, the outlook for the fourth quar-
ter also remains positive. As compared to the year
before, industrial production increased by 16.1 per-
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cent in October which once again was substantially
stronger than in September in which its growth rate
amounted to 13.9 percent. In addition, the positive
outlook is underpinned by different survey results on
the business situation in manufacturing. Further-
more, retail trade also managed to report increasing
growth rates during the second half of last year. This
was partly due to government support, i.e. increased
subsidies on consumer goods. The positive picture is
completed by exports statistics, which show that total
exports in October lay only just 13.8 percent below its
level a year before and thereby recovered clearly from
its nadir reached in summer last year. 
India experienced a strong increase of economic activ-
ity in the second and third quarter of last year. After
during winter 2008/2009 GDP only expanded by
about 4.4 percent as compared to the year before,
year-over-year growth was able to increase to 6.0 and
6.7 percent in respectively the second and third quar-
ter of last year. Early indicators suggest that especial-
ly in the last quarter of 2009 production will expand
strongly. Overall the annual GDP growth rate for
2009 is expected to be 6.1 percent. 
While the important agricultural sector for the Indian
economy could – on account of the late start of the
monsoon rains – not contribute as much as expected
to the economic recovery, this was more than com-
pensated for by the developments in the manufactur-
ing and above all the services sector. Industrial pro-
duction increased by 8.3 percent in the third quarter
as compared to the year before; the services sector
even showed an increase of 9.3 percent. These eco-
nomic developments have likely continued during the
last months of last year. Business sentiment indicators
for the aggregate economy and the manufacturing sec-
tor show an unbroken upward trend. Also the clear
increase of retail- and wholesale prices confirm a con-
tinuation of these dynamics.
The relatively stable economic development of India
explains itself, on the one hand, by the fact that its
economy is less open than many other emerging
economies. On the other hand, services play an
important role for Indian exports. Trade in services
show less of a cyclical pattern than those in industrial
goods.
The other East Asian countries of Indonesia, Malay-
sia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan
and Thailand benefited from the favourable business
cycle developments in China. In spring 2009 these
economies started a swift recovery. Before, this
region was also struck by the global recession. As
most of these economies are export-oriented, they
were especially hard hit by the massive reduction in
world trade.
A comparison of the economic developments in these
countries shows the close link between the recession
and the fall in world trade. Those countries which are
hit the hardest, i.e. Taiwan and the two trade centres,
Hong Kong and Singapore, are also the most open
economies in this region. The recessions in some of
the bigger countries, most notably Indonesia, were
somewhat milder.2 
However, the fall-out in industrial production and
foreign trade only lasted for a short time. Production
reached its trough already at the beginning of last
year and thereby earlier than elsewhere in the world.
Since then, economic activity regained pre-crisis levels
in many countries, with the strong momentum of the
high-tech industries and terminating inventory adjust-
ments as the key drivers. The strong recovery was also
supported by expansionary monetary and fiscal poli-
cy as implemented worldwide. The fact that economic
policy in Asia was more effective, quicker and
stronger than elsewhere can, on the one hand, be ex-
plained by a banking system that was largely spared
from the financial crisis that hit the US and Europe.
On the other hand, the substantial current account
surpluses built up in the past lessened the impact of
reduced capital flows as compared to other emerging
countries.
1.1.4 The rest of the world
After the economic crisis during the winter of
2008/2009, the Latin America countries of Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela man-
aged to stabilise their economies relatively early. They
benefited from the recovery in raw material prices that
started in the beginning of 2009. The region managed
to get over the financial crisis better than other
regions. After a dramatic increase in risk premia on
most government bonds during the winter, they have
quickly fallen again. Presently they are moving again
around levels that prevailed before the start of the cri-
sis. More or less the same holds for the exchange rates
of most currencies: they depreciated sharply during
the winter. However, since then they have basically
recovered again. Latin America managed to escape a
2 A similar pattern is discussed in Chapter 5.more severe impact of the worldwide trust crisis by
not having high current account deficits and therefore
by not being very dependent upon large net capital
inflows. On top of that, the financial sectors in these
countries are less connected to those centres that were
at the core of the financial crisis. Furthermore, by his-
torical standards the macroeconomic fundamentals
appear in general quite healthy and the public
finances in order.
Nevertheless, the individual countries developed
quite heterogeneously. Mexico is having difficulties
overcoming a recession that has lasted for more than
a year. Its economy is heavily dependent upon devel-
opments in the US. In particular, industry in the
northern part of the country is closely intertwined
with the US market. Furthermore, the decline of
transfer payments of migrants has led to income
losses in Mexico. Also the impact of swine flu, the
fall in oil revenues and the hard-hit car industry
should not be ignored. The position of Brazil, the
second largest economy in the region, is more
favourable. The export sector is more diversified on
a regional level; China has become the most impor-
tant trading partner even before the US. Further-
more, international trade plays a less important role
in Brazil as compared to Mexico. Although Brazil
was also hit by a sharp recession in the winter of
2008/2009, it has already been on an expansion
course again since spring last year based on its
robust domestic demand. All together, GDP in 2009
is expected to turn out 2.2 percent lower than in 2008
in Latin America as a whole.
The global economic and financial crisis hit Russia
full force. The global drop in the demand for raw
materials and the associated fall in raw material prices
led to a massive decline in export revenues. In addi-
tion, domestic factors, including problems in the
financial industry and the bursting of a speculative
bubble in the real-estate market, contributed to a
sharp fall in investments. 
Rising unemployment and falling real incomes damp-
ened private consumption. Although the Russian
economy started to stabilise by the summer of last
year, a clear recovery as in other emerging markets
does not appear to have set in. Industrial production
has freed itself from its low in May last year, but has
not regained pre-crisis growth levels. Also growth in
retail trade has been low throughout 2009. Real gross
domestic product shrank by 8.0 percent in 2009 com-
pared to 2008.
Nevertheless, the economic environment has visibly
improved. With the recovery of raw material prices, the
withdrawal of foreign capital decreased, and the 
rouble, which had lost up to 40 percent of its value to
the US dollar, appreciated clearly again. Against this
background and in view of falling inflation rates, the
central bank has loosened its monetary policy stance
gradually since the beginning of last year. However,
firm credit rates are still high and the supply of credit
by the banks remains restrictive. The government has
counteracted by granting interest subsidies and state
guarantees. However, the approval process of authori-
ties runs slowly, and the beneficiaries are primarily big
enterprises in strategically important sectors.
1.1.5 The European economy
After a drop of 5.1 percent from its peak in the first
quarter of 2008, GDP in the European Union started
to recover during the second half of 2009. Real eco-
nomic growth reached an annualised 1.0 percent in
the third quarter as compared to the second quarter
of last year. Nevertheless, private consumption con-
tinued to fall and also overall gross fixed capital for-
mation remained on the decline, albeit at a slower
pace (see Figure 1.10). Hence, besides government
consumption, foreign trade and changes in invento-
ries were able to contribute positively to economic
growth (see Figure 1.11). 
Due to the unwinding real estate prices, for instance in
Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom, residential
investment has been falling sharply since the second
quarter of 2008 and has now reached levels last seen
in 2002. After a substantial drop in 2008, other con-
struction investments, however, roughly stabilised last
year. Since the third quarter, investment in machinery
and transport equipment also seems to have stopped
falling further and is showing first signs of recovery.
Especially, transport equipment has benefited sub-
stantially from several stimulus programs of govern-
ments throughout Europe.
Both exports and imports plummeted during the win-
ter of 2008/2009. Since the third quarter of last year,
both started to pick up again. The trade balance wors-
ened over the course of the year as the fall in exports
surpassed those in imports. Hence, net trade con-
tributed negatively to GDP growth. If one views the
net demand shock around the world in terms of
changes in the trade balance, then it becomes appar-
ent which countries have had a “shock-producing”
effect on the rest of the world. Within the euro area,
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these include above all Spain,
Malta and Ireland. By contrast,
in Finland, Germany, Belgium
and the Netherlands imports
have fallen less sharply than ex-
ports (see Figure 1.12). This
group of countries helped allevi-
ate or absorb the shock within
the euro area. This was possible
inter alia because these countries
did not have to correct a real-
estate bubble. With the exception
of Slovenia, all East European
member countries of the Euro-
pean Union have seen clear im-
provements in their external bal-
ances during the crisis. Especially
those countries which kept the
exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro
stable, i.e. Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania were also
those that experienced the strong-
est improvement in their external
balance. To do this, however, they
had to stick to a relatively restric-
tive monetary policy stance
thereby suppressing their domes-
tic economies. As discussed in
Chapter 5, this is especially true
for Latvia which, on the verge of
a balance of payments crisis, has
no alternative other than aban-
doning its peg.
Mainly as a consequence of the
drop in oil prices, inflation rates
in the European Union fell until
summer last year (see Figu-
re 1.13). In the euro area even
the price level – as measured by
the harmonised index of con-
sumer prices (HICP) – fell slight-
ly between June and October.
Although in the last months of
the year, inflation picked up
again somewhat, core inflation
has not yet stopped falling. In
November the latter remained at
1.0 percent. 
With the sole exception of Po-
land, all countries went through a
deep recession last year, and the
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substantial (see Figure 1.14). A comparison of the
peak in the first quarter of 2008 with the trough in the
second quarter of 2009 reveals
that the European Union – and
with it the euro area – contracted
by 5.1 percent over a period of
five quarters. Especially the three
Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania – were hit hard by
the economic crisis and saw their
GDP dropping by approximately
20 percent. Whereas Lithuania
came out of recession in the third
quarter of last year, the situation
has not yet improved markedly in
the other two Baltic States. These
economies have already been
shrinking for six quarters in a
row. The only other central and
eastern European member coun-
try having such a prolonged re-
cession phase is Hungary. 
Of the western and southern Euro-
pean member countries, only Cyp-
rus, Greece, Spain and the United
Kingdom were still in recession in
the third quarter of last year. All
other countries returned to positive
growth. For instance, in Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Italy and
Portugal the turnaround was rela-
tively strong (with annualised
quarterly growth rates above 2 per-
cent), whereas Finland, France,
Ireland, Malta and the Nether-
lands were nevertheless able to
report annualised growth rates
between 1.0 and 1.7 percent.
In  Germany, the economy sta-
bilised in spring last year. In the
second quarter, real GDP ex-
panded by an annualised 1.8 per-
cent, in the third quarter this
was even 2.9 percent. On ac-
count of the drop during the
preceding winter semester of
nearly 6 percent, overall eco-
nomic activity – and in particu-
lar that in the export-oriented
industries – remained, however,
all in all, at a low level. Capacity
utilisation in manufacturing is still approximately 10
percentage points below its long-run average.
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Decisive for the German economic recovery was first
of all the improved state of the world economy.
German exports, which were especially hard hit by the
worldwide drop in confidence and international trade
due to Germany’s specialisation towards investment
goods and durable consumption goods, were able to
grow in the second half of 2009. In many of Ger-
many’s trading partner countries, expansionary fiscal
and monetary policies became effective and invento-
ries were built up again. Secondly, domestic invest-
ment – stimulated by fiscal packages directed towards
public construction – started to recover. Furthermore,
inventory developments gave a strong positive
impulse to growth as well. However, private consump-
tion, which was boosted by numerous expansionary
stimulus measures during the first half of 2009,
declined sharply. As the government subsidies for
scrapping older cars stopped, especially car sales
dropped. The overall increase in domestic demand
was associated with a decline in the external balance.
Although exports strongly increased, imports went up
even more during the second half of 2009 as a conse-
quence of the inventory impulse. As compared to the
first half of last year, GDP managed to increase at a
rate of 1.2 percent during the second half. However,
and as a consequence of the strong decline during the
winter of 2008/2009, GDP still fell by 5.0 percent in
2009 as compared to 2008.
Although the economic crisis has become apparent
in the labour market as well, its consequences have,
however, remained remarkably moderate. Job losses
were above all registered in the manufacturing sec-
tor. Important for the moderate decline in employ-
ment were the strong expansion of short-time work
and the depletion of credits on
working hour accounts. In addi-
tion, while full-time employ-
ment has sunk, part-time em-
ployment has increased. In the
course of 2009, the average
number of working hours sank
by 2.2 percent after already hav-
ing been reduced by a similar
order of magnitude in 2008. At
the same time – due to a fall in
labour productivity – unit la-
bour costs rose sharply (see
Table 1.1). The unemployment
rate increased somewhat during
the first half of 2009. Since July,
it seems to have stabilised at
7.6 percent, leading to an aver-
age unemployment rate of 7.5 percent in 2009. 
Whereas most European economies left the recession
behind them in the third quarter of last year, quarter-
ly GDP growth in the United Kingdom was still nega-
tive. Nevertheless, also here the signs are improving.
During the second half of 2009, private consumption
and gross fixed capital formation stopped falling and
exports started to pick up. Private consumption,
which during the first half of last year sank by an
annualised 4.8 percent was able to stabilise basically
thanks to the UK version of the “Cash for Clunkers”
program. However, the increased car purchases led to
a quicker increase of imports as compared to exports,
which in turn prevented GDP from growing during
the second half of last year. Government spending
continued to contribute positively to economic
growth, albeit at a slower pace. 
The economy of France expanded with restraint dur-
ing the second half of last year. GDP rose by an annu-
alised 1.1 percent in the third quarter, after having
increased by the same amount the quarter before.
Private consumption stagnated and investments kept
falling at a higher pace. Although the decline in non-
residential investment started to slow down, residen-
tial investment continued its descent in an unbroken
manner. However, the external balance improved
somewhat as exports grew more than imports. In
addition, the increase in GDP during the second half
of last year was promoted by a further increase in
government spending. 
During the second half of last year, the Italian econo-
my revived unexpectedly strongly. GDP rose in the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sEEAG Report 2010 23
Chapter 1
third quarter by an annualised 2.4 percent after it had
shrunk by an annualised 1.9 percent in the second
quarter. The development in industrial production
confirms that the Italian economy has surpassed its
trough. Besides an improvement in the external bal-
ance also increases in private and public consumption
contributed to this turnaround. Investments, on the
other hand, kept on falling throughout the year. In
spite of the improved situation after summer, GDP
will shrink on account of the very weak first half of
the year and the severe drop in private investments by
4.8 percent in 2009. 
Nevertheless, Italy continues to face structural factors
which reduce its international competitiveness.
Labour productivity declined faster as compared to
other euro area member countries. Consequently, unit
labour costs rose markedly, reducing the competitive-
ness of many Italian firms even further. 
From the second quarter of 2008 onwards, economic
activity in Spain has been falling – albeit since the first
quarter of 2009 at a reduced pace. The positive
impulses set by public consumption and the external
balance could still not outweigh the reduction in
investments. Private consumption stabilised during
the second half of the year. 
As measured by labour market developments, Spain
numbers amongst those European countries in
which the economic crisis has been most painful.
This is caused in particular by the breakdown of its
real-estate market. The bursting of the real-estate
bubble induced above all two negative effects on the
Spanish economy. On the one hand, households and
firms are confronted with a negative wealth effect
which dampens their consumption and investment
demand and at the same time limits their access to
loans. On the other hand, it led to massive lay-offs in
the construction sector. Consequently, unemploy-
ment increased from 9 percent in early 2008 to close
to 20 percent at the end of last year. This rise in
unemployment was furthermore aggravated by
rigidities in the labour market. Due to the indexation
of many wages, the increased inflation in 2008 has
led to upward adjustments of nominal wages, out-
pacing those in many neighbouring countries.
However, nominal wages turned out to be too rigid
to be substantially lowered during the crisis. To cir-
cumvent a substantial gap between real wage and
labour productivity growth, firms were forced to
reduce employment more than otherwise would have
been the case. 
The East European member countries of the
European Union were hit hard by the world econom-
ic crisis. Over the year, real GDP of the new member
countries that are not part of the euro area fell by
3.5 percent (see Table A.2). Although a quick recov-
ery is not in sight, stabilisation tendencies can be
observed here as well. For instance, industrial produc-
tion did not sunk further – or even increased slightly
in some countries – during the third quarter of 2009.
With respect to investment the rate of decrease is
falling. Firm expectations have improved since the
beginning of last year in nearly all of these countries,
and also consumer confidence has brightened some-
what despite the rise in unemployment. As imports
fell more strongly than exports throughout the region,
the current account deficits have been reduced quite
clearly. After several years of deficits, the Baltic States
even registered a current account surplus in 2009.
Inflation has strongly decreased in all countries, but is
– with 5.6 percent last year – still relatively high in
Romania.
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1.2.1 Fiscal policy
The economic crisis induced governments all over the
world to pursue expansionary fiscal policies. While
government expenditures rose as a result of the mas-
sive economic stimulus packages, government rev-
enues fell on account of the sharp recession, the tax
breaks as well as the reduction in employment.
Consequently, the public finance situation in the
member countries of the European Union has deteri-
orated sharply. The deficit to GDP ratio has con-
sequently increased from – 2.3 percent in 2008 to
– 6.9 percent last year (see Table 1.2). 
The current year will be a challenging and decisive
year for euro area policy-makers and the euro area
economy. Looking back on 2009, solid groundwork
was put in place to go forward. The European
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), launched in
December 2008, helped cushion the collapse of eco-
nomic activity. Without the EERP, the contraction of
euro area GDP would have been deeper. Designed for
a two-year period, it will continue to provide valuable
support this year.
Part of the government responses to the crisis are
automatic, in the sense that without direct govern-
ment action revenues fall relative to GDP, e.g. due to
the progressive tax system, and expenditures rise, e.g.due to increased unemployment and welfare benefits.
The severity of the economic crisis and especially the
near meltdown of the financial system in autumn
2008 created a situation in which most governments
agreed that it would not be sufficient to rely solely on
these so-called automatic stabilisers. However, as the
output smoothing capacity of automatic stabilisers
varies substantially across countries (see Girouard
and André, 2005) – many measures came in the form
of guarantees and the actual size of many individual
programs are hard to determine – it is quite challeng-
ing to come up with comparable estimates of the fis-
cal impulses given by the public sector during the cri-
sis across countries. A relatively straightforward sum-
mary measure, however, is the change in the primary
deficit of the general government throughout the cri-
sis. It includes both discretionary measures taken by
the general government as well as the automatic sta-
bilisers. Furthermore, as it is generally believed that
changes in interest payments by the government do
not have a strong impact on the economy and are not
intended as such, the primary balance – which ex-
cludes these – is likely to be a better measure than the
change in the fiscal balance per se.
Compared to their share of pre-crisis GDP (i.e. in
2007), the primary deficit in both the euro area and
the European Union increased by 4.4 percentage
points in 2009, after already having increased by,
respectively, 1.3 and 1.5 percentage points in 2008 (see
Figure 1.15). The differences across countries and the
two crisis years are substantial. Whereas the govern-
ments in Spain and Ireland already stimulated their
economies in 2008, those in Finland and the United
Kingdom became more active in 2009. In Italy and
Germany government actions were – relative to the
rest of Europe – more conservative.
Structural deficits – that part of the deficit which can-
not be attributed to automatic stabilisers, i.e. the busi-
ness cycle – also increased substantially around the
world. This indicates that to a considerable extent the
increase in deficits was induced by discretionary poli-
cy. Compared to the US and Japan, its increase in the
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2001–2006  2007 2008 2009  2001–2006  2007 2008 2009 
Germany  64.0  65.0  65.9  73.1  – 3.2  0.2  0.0  –   3.4 
France 62.3  63.8  67.4  76.1  – 2.9  – 2.7  – 3.4  –   8.3 
Italy  105.8  103.5  105.8  114.6  – 3.4  – 1.5  – 2.7  –   5.3 
Spain 47.6  36.1  39.7  54.3  0.2  1.9  –  4.1  –  11.2 
Netherlands 50.8  45.5  58.2  59.8  – 1.2  0.2  0.7  –   4.7 
Belgium 97.0  84.2  89.8  97.2  – 0.4  – 0.2  – 1.2  –   5.9 
Austria 65.0  59.5  62.6  69.1  – 1.6  – 0.6  – 0.4  –   4.3 
Greece 99.6  95.6  99.2  112.6  – 5.1  – 3.7  – 7.7  – 12.7 
Ireland 30.1  25.1  44.1  65.8  1.2  0.3  –  7.2  –  12.5 
Finland  42.2  35.2  34.1  41.3  3.5  5.2  4.5  –   2.8 
Portugal 58.7  63.6  66.3  77.4  – 3.9  – 2.6  – 2.7  –   8.0 
Slovakia 40.1  29.3  27.7  34.6  – 4.4  – 1.9  – 2.3  –   6.3 
Slovenia 27.3  23.3  22.5  35.1  – 2.4  0.0  – 1.8  –   6.3 
Luxembourg  6.4  6.6  13.5  15.0  1.5  3.7  2.5  –   2.2 
Cyprus 66.4  58.3  48.4  53.2  – 3.5  3.4  0.9  –   3.5 
Malta 66.3  62.0  63.8  68.5  – 5.3  – 2.2  – 4.7  –   4.5 
Euro o Area a  68.9 9  66.0 0  69.3 3  78.2 2  – – 2.4 4  – – 0.6 6  – – 2.0 0  – –    
6.4 4 
United Kingdom 40.0  44.2  52.0  68.6  – 2.4  – 2.7  – 5.0  – 12.1 
Sweden 51.2  40.5  38.0  42.1  0.9  3.8  2.5  –   2.1 
Denmark  42.2  26.8  33.5  33.7  2.4  4.5  3.4  –   2.0 
Poland  44.6  45.0  47.2  51.7  – 5.0  – 1.9  – 3.6  –   6.4 
Czech Republic 28.9  29.0  30.0  36.5  – 4.7  – 0.7  – 2.1  –   6.6 
Hungary 58.8  65.9  72.9  79.1  – 7.3  – 5.0  – 3.8  –   4.1 
Romania 19.8  12.6  13.6  21.8  – 1.9  – 2.5  – 5.5  –   7.8 
Lithuania 20.4  16.9  15.6  29.9  – 1.5  – 1.0  – 3.2  –   9.8 
Bulgaria 42.8  18.2  14.1  15.1  1.0  0.1  1.8  –   0.8 
Latvia 13.4  9.0  19.5  33.2  – 1.3  – 0.3  – 4.1  –   9.0 
Estonia 5.0  3.8  4.6  7.4  1.2  2.6  – 2.7  –   3.0 
EU27 7  61.5 5  58.7 7  61.5 5  73.0 0  – – 2.3 3  – – 0.8 8  – – 2.3 3  – –    
6.9 9 
a) As a percentage of gross domestic product; definitions according to the Maastricht Treaty.EEAG Report 2010 25
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euro area was slightly less dramatic last year. Also for
2010, the increase in the structural deficit in the euro
area is expected to be less than in the US and Japan
(see Figure 1.16).
The public finance situation will worsen in the years
to come. Last year, only Finland and Luxembourg,
as members of the European Monetary Union
(EMU), managed to keep their deficits below 3 per-
cent of GDP. However, it is to be expected that all
EMU member countries will breach this deficit cri-
teria this year. As a consequence the European
Commission has opened new deficit procedures
against many countries, including Austria, Germany
and Italy, while deficit procedures are already run-
ning against France, Greece, Ireland, Malta and
Spain. Its purpose is to start reducing budget deficits
from 2011 onwards and to sup-
press it below 3 percent of GDP
by 2013. Given the weakness of
the European economy, it is to
be expected that the deficit-to-
GDP ratio will reach 7 percent
this year (see Table A.3).
The increased indebtness of Eu-
ropean governments together
with slowly rising interest rates
will raise the debt burden. Gov-
ernment interest expenses are
bound to rise in the years to come
and crowd out other types of
government spending. This is
already a good reason for govern-
ments to prepare and communi-
cate exit and consolidation strategies to return to
sound and sustainable public finances again. More
importantly, such strategies are needed to strengthen
overall macroeconomic stability and to guarantee that
any future crisis can again be relieved by appropriate
fiscal policy measures. 
After several years of consolidation, public finances
in Germany ran into difficulties in 2009. Whereas the
fiscal balance had improved from an average of
– 3.2 percent during 2001–2006 to + 0.2 percent in
2007, it is calculated to be – 3.4 percent last year.
Mainly due to lower tax receipts, government rev-
enues sank by 2.0 percent in 2009. In addition to the
economic crisis, the reduction in tax receipts was also
partly caused by the tax revision for firms in 2008.
Government expenditures increased by 4.8 percent in
2009. The reasons for this sub-
stantial increase are manifold.
First, the deterioration of the
labour market has led to higher
expenditures on unemployment
benefits and short-time work.
Second, due to new arrange-
ments with hospital and general
practitioners, health expenses
went up. Third, personnel ex-
penses of the state expanded
after substantial wage hikes.
Fourth, transfer payments in-
creased substantially, also due to
the old-car scrappage program,
which has cost the German gov-
ernment approximately 5 billion
euros. Finally, triggered by the
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increased by 7.5 percent. 
The financial situation of the German government is
expected to deteriorate further also this year – albeit
at a lesser pace. The burden falls on both the income
side – as a result of an income tax reform and cycli-
cal reductions in tax revenues – as well as the expen-
diture side – caused by increased transfers and public
investments. 
Fiscal policy will start to have a dampening effect on
economic development in the United Kingdom. The
immense increase of the deficit-to-GDP ratio to
12.1 percent last year will force the government to
curtail expenditures and raise taxes. Already at the
start of this year the temporary reduction of the
value added tax from 17.5 percent to 15 percent has
ended. This will restrain private consumption at least
temporarily.
The public finance situation in France has worsened
noticeably not only as a result of the massive eco-
nomic stimulus measures but also on account of the
cyclically reduced tax revenues and social security
contributions. Furthermore, the cost to support
banks has taken its toll. The public deficit rose to
8.3 percent of GDP last year. Although the European
Commission has already initiated a deficit procedure
for France, concrete consolidation measures have not
been decided. The fiscal budgets only indicate a mod-
erate reduction of deficits with the goal of fulfilling
the deficit criterion of the European Stability and
Growth Pact again by 2013 at the earliest.
On account of an already high debt-to-GDP ratio
exceeding 100 percent before the crisis, the Italian
government did not have much room to manoeuvre.
Accordingly it limited itself to a small economic
stimulus package in 2009. Even so, its deficit rose to
5.3 percent of GDP last year. In the absence of clear
consolidation plans by the Italian government, the
European Commission decided in November last
year to open a deficit procedure against Italy. The
public deficit should be reduced to less than 3 per-
cent of GDP by 2012 at the latest. The required re-
forms will dampen the economic recovery in the
years to come.
The tense economic situation and the large-scale stim-
ulus programs initiated by the government have wors-
ened the fiscal position of Spain dramatically. A
deficit of 11.2 percent of GDP resulted in 2009.
Induced by the deficit procedure initiated by the
European Commission, the Spanish government
decided to begin with the necessary consolidation of
its finances already in 2010. In September last year,
Spain presented a package of tax increases which will
amount to 1.1 percent of its GDP. It contains the can-
celation of various tax breaks, the increase of the
value added tax by two percentage points to 18 per-
cent, as well as a rise in capital income taxes. In spite
of these restrictive measures, the economic situation
will not allow the deficit-to-GDP ratio to fall sub-
stantially anytime soon. 
1.2.2 Monetary conditions and financial markets
Monetary conditions
After September 2008, monetary policy in the west-
ern world was first of all directed towards securing
the refinancing of private banks. After the bank-
ruptcy of Lehman Brothers, trust in especially the
banking system was devastated and only cutting
interest rates would not have been sufficient to pre-
vent a meltdown of the financial system as we know
it. Hence, a series of unconventional measures were
undertaken which basically implied that central
banks turned into the main providers of liquidity on
interbank markets. 
Whereas the Federal Reserve and the Bank of
England cut their key policy rates from 2.0 and
5.0 percent to 0.25 and 0.5 percent, respectively, since
October 2008, the ECB reduced it from 4.25 percent
to 1.0 percent in May 2009 (see Figure 1.17). More
importantly, all three introduced non-standard mea-
sures to combat the crisis. For instance, the ECB
embarked on a policy of fully accommodating banks’
liquidity and extended the range of open market oper-
ations to include euro operations with maturities of
one month, six months and one year, as well as oper-
ations providing US dollar and Swiss franc liquidity.
In addition, the ECB has started purchasing euro-
denominated covered bonds in July last year – a pro-
gram which is targeted to buy up to 60 billion euros by
June 2010.
As a consequence, the average maturity of these cred-
its to the banking system increased further and the
share of the once “main” refinancing operations with
a maturity of one week only reached 8 percent in
November of last year. This caused the overnight
interbank rate to be, on average, only 0.4 percent and
hence substantially below the interest rates to be paid
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to the ECB for its open market
operations. Also the 3-month un-
secured interbank rate (Euribor)
decreased substantially through-
out the year and reached an aver-
age of 0.7 percent during the last
two months of 2009. Further-
more, these unconventional mea-
sures were successful in steadily
bringing back the risk premium
in the interbank markets for un-
secured money to close to pre-cri-
sis levels (see Figure 1.18). 
The unconventional measures
have not only caused central
banks’ balance sheet to blow up
since the start of the crisis, but
the narrowly defined concepts of
money, which are under close
control by the central banks,
have also been expanded sub-
stantially. In the euro area, the
narrowest concept of money, i.e.
currency in circulation, went up
by closed to 14 percent since
September 2008 (see Fig-
ure 1.19). Similarly, the mone-
tary aggregate M1 grew by over
15 percent over the same period.
A look, however, at broader con-
cepts of money, which stress the
role of the banking sector in the
money creation process, gives a
completely different picture.
Since October 2008 there has
practically been no movement in
the most commonly used money
supply measure, M3. In a year-
on-year comparison, M3 shrank
by 0.6 percent in December last
year. Hence, although the ECB
has provided the banking sector
with ample liquidity to circum-
vent further problems within
that sector, this additional liq-
uidity has not been fully passed
on to the private economy but
merely prevented M3 from
falling. This is not only observed
in the euro area and can explain
why central banks all over the
world have changed their focus
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banking sector towards securing
credit supply to non-financial
corporations and households
over time.
The lowering of interest rates by
the ECB has also been reflected
in falling lending rates for the
non-financial sector. Until No-
vember last year the decline of
the 3-month interbank rate, as
measure of the refinancing costs
of banks, since its peak in
October 2008 equalled 440 basis
points. For large loans, i.e. those
above 1 million euros, with a
maturity up to one year more
than 80 percent of this was transmitted to the firms
(see Figure 1.20). On the other hand, the interest rates
on long-term loans and especially those below 1 mil-
lion euros remained relatively stable – only a third of
the reduced refinancing costs were transmitted. To a
large extent this reflects that the present expansionary
monetary policy stance is not expected to last forever.
Obviously, however, this is also raising the profitabili-
ty of credit business of banks, at least in the short
term.
Despite these interest rate developments, credit vol-
umes to the non-financial sector have not been able to
pick up (see Figure 1.21). Whereas credit to house-
holds started stagnating in mid-2008, corporate cred-
its have been falling since early 2009. The annual
growth rate of the latter was – 2.7 percent in De-
cember last year. From May 2009
onwards household loans to
finance house purchases are pick-
ing up again slightly. Mortgage
loans were 1.7 percent higher last
December as compared to the
year before.
This indicates that it continues
to be more difficult to acquire
bank credits than it was before
the crisis started. However, in
both the US and the euro area,
it has so far been difficult to
find clear evidence in favour of
an already existing credit
crunch, in the sense that due to
own balance sheet problems
banks are reluctant to supply new credits to healthy
firms coming up with solid business plans. It still
appears to be the case that – due to the loss in con-
fidence and a general decline in demand for goods
and services – the demand for credit has simply fall-
en. This is also reflected by the results of the busi-
ness tendency surveys published by the European
Commission. While the percentage of firms report-
ing that financial constraints are limiting their pro-
duction possibilities has somewhat increased from
3.3 and 4.0 percent in the second quarter of 2008 to
4.9 and 4.4 percent at the end of last year, respec-
tively, the percentage of firms in the manufacturing
and construction sectors reporting that the lack of
demand was causing them problems increased by
32.6 and 17.3 percentage points during the same
period, respectively (see Figure 1.22).
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However, demand is slowly starting to pick up again
and firms might soon be willing to invest in the future
again. Consequently, the still prevailing problems
within the banking sector might soon reveal that the
banks’willingness to supply cred-
its is indeed strongly hampered.
That would restrain a swift recov-
ery and therefore it is certainly
something to worry about in the
time to come. A sudden introduc-
tion of increased capital require-
ments for banks, which is certain-
ly needed in the medium term to
avoid similar banking crises in
the future, could further hinder
the credit supply by banks.
In Germany it appears that espe-
cially larger firms are already
confronted with rather restrictive
behaviour of banks (see Box 1.1).
Not only have interest rates on
large new loans been falling less than in other euro
area countries, also a unique business tendency survey
in which firms are directly asked about the willingness
of banks to supply them with credit suggests that
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Box x 1.1 1 
Is s there e a a credit t crunch h in n Germany? 
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis and in particular since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the share of firms in the
German manufacturing sector that have indicated a restrictive willingness of banks to lend steadily increased from
15 percent to about 45 percent (see Figure 1.23). These results of the so-called credit constraint indicator are based on
approximately 2,300 responses to a monthly survey conducted by the Ifo Institute for Economic Research. The firms are 
asked to provide information on banks’ credit supply conditions by responding to the following question: “How would you 
assess the current willingness of banks to extend credit to businesses”? The answers to choose from are “accommodating”, 
“normal” and “restrictive”. While in regular times large firms typically have better access to credit, one of the
characteristics of the current financial crisis is that in particular these firms, at least in Germany, are more credit constrained
than small and medium-sized firms.
A tightening of the banks’ credit supply conditions in an economic downturn is nothing unusual, however. In order to
identify a credit crunch, which is commonly defined “as a significant leftward shift in the supply curve for loans” 
(Bernanke and Lown, 1991), we need to adjust the survey responses for the regular determinants of the supply curve, in
particular “the safe real interest rate and the quality of potential borrowers” (ibid.). Using a conditional fixed-effects logistic 
model where the dependent variable is a binary choice variable, which measures the firms’ perception of the banks’ credit
conditions, Düwel et al. (2010) estimate a credit crunch indicator in a two-step procedure.
In a first step they regress the response to the credit question on a set of both firm-specific and macroeconomic variables.
The firm-specific variables, which are also taken from the monthly Ifo survey, are used as proxies for the quality of a firm.
They measure the firms’ current state of business and its current volume of orders in hand. The macroeconomic variables
measure the overall economic activity and the banks’ refinancing costs. In a second step, they replace the macroeconomic
variables by T-1 time dummies, where T is the number of surveys between June 2003 (when the credit question was first
asked) and November 2009. The idea is that the time dummies capture both types of variations of banks’ lending practices 
over time: the macro factors (overall economic activity and banks’ refinancing costs) and some remaining factors, which are 
qualified as bank-specific determinants of credit supply. Finally, a credit crunch indicator is generated which takes that part
of the (leftward) shifts in the credit supply curve that are neither explained by firm-specific nor macroeconomic factors and,
hence, are likely to be caused by bank-specific factors. Technically, the credit crunch indicator is calculated as the 
difference between the predicted probabilities of a restrictive credit supply policy for high-quality firms (i.e. for firms which 
assess their current business situation as “good” and their volume of orders as “relatively high”) of the second and the first
step of the regression.
At the end of 2008 and early 2009 government intervention, like the massive public sector equity support to banks, was
initially able to reduce the probability of a restrictive access to credit for high-quality firms in Germany. However, the
credit crunch indicator has been steadily rising since. It changed from negative to positive mid-2009 and reached a value of
+4 percentage points by the end of the year. In a historical perspective this is still to be considered low. However, across 
firm size substantial differences emerge. Given the massive deterioration of the firms’ quality during the recession and the 
evolution of the macroeconomic determinants of credit supply, the situation for small and medium-sized firms turns out to
be “normal”. On the other hand, the restrictive stance of the banks’ lending practices has reached unprecedented levels and
is as such perceived to be high by large firms.especially the bigger firms have increasingly had prob-
lems acquiring new loans. The reduction in business
activity of major foreign banks from Germany, which
maintained above all relation-
ships with these larger firms, can
explain why these firms face such
problems. Roughly half of the
decline in credit to the manufac-
turing sector during the third
quarter of last year can be ex-
plained by the pullback of for-
eign banks.
Although nominal interest rates
continued to fall last year, this
does not automatically imply that
the overall monetary conditions
have improved. Not only credit
supply behaviour of banks mat-
ter in that respect, also inflation
and exchange rate developments
are important to determine the
monetary conditions in the euro
area. Whereas inflation rates fell,
limiting the reduction in real
interest rates, the euro continued
to appreciate in real effective
terms. All in all, monetary condi-
tions as measured by the weight-
ed average of the real short-term
interest rate and the real effective
exchange rate remained relatively
constant and still slightly above
its long-run average throughout
last year (see Figure 1.24). 
The ECB will leave its main refinancing rate at its low
level this year. However, the ECB has already
announced that it will move suc-
cessively away from its policy of
providing unlimited liquidity and
repurchasing arrangements with
longer maturities. Therefore,
money market interest will start
rising and thereby approach the
main refinancing rate of 1 per-
cent during the year. Given the
large output gap and the extreme-
ly modest inflation developments,
the ECB will not start increasing
its own interest rates at least until
the end of 2010. 
Also the Bank of England will
stick to its accommodative mone-
tary policy stance. Not only inter-
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est rates are low, also the British
pound has depreciated substan-
tially against the euro since the
start of the crisis and has not
recovered from it since. The Bank
of England left its bank rate at
0.5 percent and once more in-
creased the size of its program to
buy government bonds by 25 bil-
lion UK pounds to 200 billion
UK pounds in November last
year.
Bonds, stocks and foreign 
exchange markets
At the peak of the economic cri-
sis the flight to quality lowered
government bond yields of the US, Japan and large
European economies substantially. Throughout the
first half of last year, as confidence picked up again,
this process was at least initially reversed. Only in
China did government bond yields continue to fall
almost consistently since early 2009. Comparing the
yield level at the end of 2009 with one year before
reveals a decrease of close to 70 basis points for
China, whereas during the same period in the US
yields increased by almost 120 basis points. In Japan
and in the euro area, levels have not changed much
(see Figure 1.25). 
The surge towards safe assets caused higher risk pre-
mia on corporate bonds and government bonds of
smaller economies during the crisis months. The
reversal has occurred since spring last year. The yields
on corporate bonds have fallen due in particular to a
decline in risk premia. Yields on corporate bonds of
the highest quality (AAA) and a maturity of two
years have in the euro area decreased by approximate-
ly 100 basis points since early 2009; those with BBB
ratings saw a decline of about 250 basis points in
yields.
With respect to government bonds, the only exception
of the above-described pattern is Greece. The spread
between its government bonds and the synthetic (i.e.
its weighted average) government bond for the euro
area reveals that since the end of summer the default
risk of the Greek government has risen sharply again.
In January this year, its government bond yield was
almost 245 and 275 basis points above those for the
euro area and Germany, respectively (see Figure 1.26).
With a fiscal deficit of 12.7 percent – the highest in the
European Union – and a debt level of well above
110 percent of its GDP last year
(with the prospect of reaching the
highest level within the European
Union here as well), financial
markets do not consider public
finances in Greece to be sustain-
able anymore.3
Another positive influence on the
financial conditions for especially
larger firms has been the increase
in stock market prices in early
spring last year. Also due to the
low interest rate environment, by
the end of last year, the Euro
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this issue.STOXX 50 improved by 47 percent since its trough in
March and has reduced its gap to its highest level
reached in June 2007 to 35 percent (see Figure 1.27).
Comparing the peak and trough
reveals that during the crisis a
drop of 55 percent occurred.
Similar figures hold for basically
all major stock market indexes
around the world. After having
experienced a drop of 50 percent
during the crisis, they have all
gained about 40 percent by the
end of last year, thereby reducing
the fall to approximately 30 per-
cent. Furthermore, overall vola-
tility in stock markets – as for
example measured by the implied
volatility on the S&P 100 and
which has become known as the
financial “fear factor” – has
decreased substantially.4
Not only were bond and stock
markets in turmoil during the cri-
sis, but also exchange rates were
quite volatile during that period.
Whereas the euro sharply depre-
ciated against the US dollar dur-
ing the crisis, it regained much of
its strength again during the
course of last year (see Fig-
ure 1.28). The historically strong
euro is reducing international
competitiveness of its member
countries and shifting at least
part of the burden of the eco-
nomic crisis on to euro area. 
Also within Europe exchange rates
moved quite a bit during the year.
The depreciation of the currencies
of EU member countries against
the euro has helped cushion the
crisis in those economies. The cur-
rencies which had clearly given
way during the crisis, i.e. the Czech
crown, Hungarian forint, Polish
zloty, Romanian leu, and the UK
pound, partly made up for their
losses during spring and summer
last year (see Figure 1.29). Still all
of them remain at values below
those observed shortly before the
crisis. On the one hand, this will
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benefit their competitiveness. On the other hand, for
the eastern European countries, whose debt is largely
denominated in euros, it also implies a higher foreign
debt burden. 
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1.3.1 The global economy
In the course of 2009, most countries in the world
moved out of recession or at least witnessed a stabili-
sation of their economies. Coming from mostly his-
torical lows, expectations of the Ifo World Economic
Survey have skyrocketed in all major regions of the
world economy and even reached a historical high in
Asia (see Figure 1.30). Given the tremendous fall –
which can only be partly reflected in these kinds of
surveys due to the bounded nature of the answering
categories – many participating experts have realised
that their economies have hit rock-bottom and that
factually anything else than an improvement of the
situation is becoming more and more unrealistic.
Furthermore, it is likely that they have also updated
their beliefs about what could be the worst state of the
world. Hence, given the relative nature of these survey
questions and the changed focal point, one has to be
careful not to draw too strong conclusions from them
in the present situation. Nevertheless, it is safe to say
that experts around the world increasingly tend to
agree that the economic recovery will continue in the
months to come.
Although not all problems have been solved, the
uncertainty concerning future business cycle develop-
ments has diminished – although remaining high in an
historical perspective – and the sales prospects of
many firms have improved, however, after often hav-
ing reached historical lows. The huge fiscal stimulus
measures and expansionary monetary policy stance
have prevented an even worse outcome. Industrial
production has started its recovery after its sharp fall
and also the normalisation of world trade is under-
way. The latter is also due to the improved trade
finance possibilities which were severely constrained
during the crisis.
However, the world economic recovery will only tem-
porarily turn out to be stronger than in autumn last
year. Structural problems, which suppress economic
growth, continue to be large. For instance, credit
supply of banks will remain restrictive. A credit
crunch in the light of the increased demand for
external funds is becoming more likely. However, the
strong under utilisation of production capacities will
continue and thereby keep the demand for net invest-
ments comparatively low. Furthermore, the labour
market situation will not only remain depressed, but
will slightly deteriorate further, dampening private
consumption.
Furthermore, uncertainties, mistrust and panic-
stricken reactions all around the world during the
peak of the crisis have triggered a general de-lever-
aging process throughout the economy and have led
to a surge in liquidity demand.5 To generate liquidi-
ty, many firms were forced to reduce inventories sub-
stantially. Stabilisation also implies that this process
of reducing inventories has been stopped and for the
time-being even reversed. Such inventory cycles,
however, are generally not long-lived and the cur-
rently observed positive impulses are bound to end
anytime soon.
Finally, policy impulses, i.e. addi-
tional policy measures, which so
far have not only stabilised but
also revived the world economy,
will become weaker during our
forecasting horizon. Especially
fiscal policy stimulus will fade
and even turn negative. The fiscal
balance situation in most coun-
tries has worsened dramatically
and will continue to do so in the
years to come. If they have not
already done so, governments
must inevitably develop strategies
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sequently implement them. This
will retard the recovery process
further. Hence, the world econo-
my will start lose momentum
during 2010.
After an unprecedented drop
since World War II of minus
2.3 percent last year, we expect
world GDP to increase by
2.5 percent in 2010. Hence, world
economic growth will stay below
its long-run average.6 Combined
with a usual increase in labour
supply and further technological
progress, this will not prevent
unemployment rates from con-
tinuing to rise. Inflation will accelerate somewhat, but
also stay well below its long-run average. 
Despite the economic crisis in Japan, the only region
that still managed to contribute to economic growth
positively last year was Asia (see Figure 1.31). Its
growth contribution this year will reach almost pre-
crisis levels again. The two regions that remain well-
below their potential are North America and Europe.
Of the four major regions in the world, it is evident
that none of them will reach pre-crisis levels again this
year (see Figure 1.32).
1.3.2 United States
Although the recession has ended, the US economy
still has to conquer its structural problems. US con-
sumers have been living beyond their means for too
long. To allow for a way back to sustainable growth,
US consumers are in a process of curtailing their con-
sumption. This process has already set in but needs to
continue during our forecasting horizon. However, it
should ultimately not be compensated for by an
increase in public deficits – as presently is the case.7
Furthermore, although the worse seems to be over for
the banking industry, a continuation of write-offs – as
predicted by the IMF (2009) – is highly likely and gov-
ernment interference in the banking and real estate
sectors will consequently remain high. On top of that
– and as discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 – fiscal
sustainability is a new issue that will stay on the agen-
da for the years to come.
The fiscal stimulus package will unfold its biggest
influence on the deficit in fiscal 2010 when about
400 billion US dollars of the
estimated 787 billion US dollars
becomes effective. On top of
that, rising social expenses, par-
ticularly in areas related to the
labour market and the health
sector, will hardly result in a low-
ering of the budget deficit in fis-
cal 2010 despite the reduction in
expenses related to banking sec-
tor. Therefore, the debt-to-GDP
ratio will surpass 90 percent this
year. This will further limit the
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room for manoeuvre of the US government in the
years to come.
Many banks are still not willing to add mortgage
loans onto their own balance sheets. Consequently,
approximately 95 percent of all new mortgage loans
are currently issued and securitised by the government
supported enterprises, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and
Ginnie Mae. These mortgage-backed securities are
mainly bought by the Federal Reserve. Hence, termi-
nating this kind of monetary assistance – as scheduled
for the first quarter this year – will put a substantial
burden on the mortgage market. Besides increases in
mortgage interest rates and a further rationing of
mortgage supply, it is quite possible that this will trig-
ger further reductions in real estate prices. Also to
alleviate this, the Federal Reserve will continue its
zero-interest rate policy throughout this year. 
Although monthly data on private consumption give
a relatively upbeat impression of the fourth quarter of
last year, consumer sentiment surveys, on the other
hand, indicate that consumer confidence remains low.
In particular, the persistently tense labour market sit-
uation is responsible for this. The sharp rise in unem-
ployment is increasingly restraining income develop-
ments of households. The increase in nominal wages
has already slowed down noticeably and real wages
will be under pressure more and more especially now
that the negative base effect on inflation caused by the
drop in energy prices last year has ended. Due to
falling interest and dividend income, real disposable
income – the most important determinant of private
consumption – already fell during the third quarter of
last year.
Reducing the indebtedness of households will increas-
ingly restrain consumption. Saving rates have already
increased from approximately 1 percent in early 2008
to around 4.5 percent at the end of last year. This
process is likely to continue as is also shown by
reduced lending to households, in particular with
respect to credit card loans. Consumer loans have
already sunk nine months in a row up until October
last year. With the expiration of state support in the
course of 2010, private consumption will hardly
expand anymore.
Investment will stop declining. Although the situation
on the real-estate market remains fragile, residential
construction already stopped falling during the sec-
ond half of last year. More stable business conditions
will induce the same with respect to non-residential
construction investments and investments in equip-
ment and software. Credit constraints and subdued
domestic developments will prevent fixed capital for-
mation from taking a lead in the US recovery.
Although both exports and imports will continue to
grow, the weak dollar and the constraints on domestic
demand will allow net exports to contribute positive-
ly to economic growth. Consequently, the current
account deficit will continue to be reduced – albeit at
a slower pace than last year. 
Driven by extensive monetary and fiscal policy as well
as cyclically-determined inventory investments, over-
all production will still noticeably expand during this
winter half-year. However, as the impact of these sup-
portive elements will weaken and the heavy burdens
on private consumption will remain, GDP growth will
lose its momentum. After a decline of 2.6 percent last
year, GDP will expand by 1.9 percent this year. The
unemployment rate will reach an average of 9.5 per-
cent this year.
After the recession and the fall in energy prices caused
inflation in the US to even turn negative last year,
consumer prices will start to increase again at very
moderate rates. For this year, we expect annual infla-
tion to equal 1.6 percent.
1.3.3 Japan, China, India and other Asian countries
Although  Japan will continue its recovery in the
short run, the medium-term expectations are quite
bleak. Whereas both private consumption and
exports allowed for relatively positive developments
during the last three quarters of 2009, it is to be
expected that only the latter will remain the main
driver of growth this year. The Japanese export
economy benefits from its geographical proximity to
Asian emerging markets, which are experiencing a
surge in domestic demand. 
Especially the slack in private consumption will sup-
press the domestic economy. As most of the con-
sumption-oriented stimulus packages are expected to
be phased out in the first half of 2010, a setback in
consumption growth is likely. With the prolonged
duration of the under-utilisation of production
capacities, both employment and wages are expected
to decrease. Furthermore, the persistent deflation will
attenuate private demand. Although exports will
remain the main pillar for economic growth based on
the surge in demand from China, the strong yen –reaching a 14-year peak against the US dollar at the
end of November last year – will nevertheless restrain
the export-dependent Japanese economy. 
The Japanese authorities take these risks seriously
and have – contrary to other governments in the
Asian region – initiated new measures to stimulate
the economy. At the beginning of December last
year, the Japanese government launched an addi-
tional stimulus package of 7.2 trillion yen (54 billion
euros) directed towards domestic demand to prevent
the menacing drop in consumption. The Bank of
Japan has announced intentions to stick to its low-
interest rate policy for the time being and has once
again provided liquidity of more than 10 trillion yen
(76 billion euros) to the banking sector to boost
credit supply.
Consequently, these measures will further increase
public deficit and debt as a percentage of GDP this
year. The latter will surely surpass 200 percent this
year. Although the public finance situation is unlikely
to be sustainable in the long run, the situation in
Japan is – in an international comparison – quite
unique. Although the public sector has been dissaving
for decades, the savings rate of the private sector more
than compensates for this. Japan for years has already
been a net creditor to the rest of the world. Hence, it
has at least thus far been relatively easy for the
Japanese government to finance its debt domestically
at low cost – the 10-year government bond yield hov-
ers at around 1.3 percent presently. Approximately
90 percent of Japanese government debt is owned by
Japanese individuals. 
In 2010, the positive impulses from the world econ-
omy, and in particular from China, will prevail over
the domestic problems. All in all, economic growth
will amount to 1.0 percent (after – 5.3 percent last
year).
The short-term economic prospects for China remain
quite positive. This can especially be traced back to
government policy which succeeded – with a massive
stimulus program – in strengthening its economy
without relying on outside impulses. The program is
scheduled to run out by the middle of this year and
will not be fully compensated for by impulses from the
rest of the world. As a consequence, GDP growth will
equal 8.5 percent this year.
This optimistic view is not clouded by an increase in
inflation. After having been partly negative during
last year, it will stay below 3 percent this year.
Furthermore, according to official statistics, the
unemployment rate in urban regions remains low.
Also from the exchange rate side no negative impuls-
es are to be expected. In spite of criticism from
abroad, the Chinese government appears to be
retaining its policy of keeping a fixed exchange rate
to the US dollar, thereby continuing to subsidise its
export-oriented economy via a strongly undervalued
renminbi.
In principle, the room to manoeuvre for the Chinese
government remains large. The success of the stimulus
packages have induced larger than expected govern-
ment revenues. Thus, the fiscal deficit reached only
around 3 percent of GDP last year and the public
debt remains modest. Nevertheless, economic policy
is increasingly putting a burden on the Chinese econ-
omy by aggravating unbalanced economic develop-
ments. Already during the past years gross capital for-
mation, at a share of more than 40 percent, was
extremely high – even larger than the share of private
consumption (about 35 percent).8 As a clear focus of
the economic stimulus package is to support invest-
ment activity of large, often state-controlled, enter-
prises, their weight will even increase further. In the
medium term, many of these investments may prove
to be misdirected, unprofitable and may lead to over-
capacities in some sectors. Furthermore, the strong
increase in credit growth has induced a boom in both
stock and real-estate markets which might turn out to
be bubbles. 
Also India has to a large extent been able to remain
close to its long-run growth path throughout the cri-
sis. The outlook for this year remains favourable and
its growth rate is bound to remain robust. We expect
an increase of GDP by about 6.8 percent.
In light of this, both government and central bank
have announced that they will terminate their stimu-
lus measures. At the end of last year, the government
announced that it would reduce its funds to support
the economy this year. This was not only triggered by
the improved economic situation, but also by the esti-
mated large budget deficits of 7 percent of GDP both
last and this year. Also at the end of last year, the
central bank of India announced its aspiration to
raise interest rate in the first quarter in 2010 again.
Among the central banks in Asia, it thereby takes the
lead. Higher inflation forecasts have probably been
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decisive for this decision. Due to low precipitation
already in October last year, food prices have surged.
The inflation rate is likely to increase to beyond 5 per-
cent this year.
In the remaining emerging economies of Asia, i.e.
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, the recovery will contin-
ue. Although domestic demand will also pick up, the
region will mainly benefit from economic develop-
ments in China. Hence, the current account surplus of
the region will – after having been reduced last year –
increase again. GDP of these East Asian countries
will grow by a moderate 3.5 percent this year. 
1.3.4 The rest of the world
The present recovery of the global economy and its
subsequent slow-down will also affect Latin America
and Russia. 
For the Latin American countries of Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and  Venezuela,
sound economic conditions assure that its recovery
can continue to be largely driven by domestic fac-
tors. Consequently, the current account deficit which
has emerged during the crisis – and reflects the
buffering function of this region for the world econ-
omy during the crisis – will remain negative through-
out our forecasting period. GDP having shrunk by
2.2 percent last year, the region will expand by
3.1 percent in 2010.
Not all countries in this region will recover at the
same speed. Whereas growth will remain compara-
tively strong in Brazil as a result of the robust domes-
tic demand, it will be much weaker in Mexico. The lat-
ter continues to suffer from its proximity to and there-
by dependence on the US economy. Some of the
countries benefit from the recent increase in raw mate-
rial prices.
Economic activity in Russia will only increase gradu-
ally. GDP growth is expected to rise by only 1.5 per-
cent this year, after having fallen by 8.0 percent in
2009. Especially the recovery of investment will be
slow. The worldwide increase in demand for raw mate-
rial – and in particular from China, the second most
important trading partner of Russia – will, on the
other hand, be supportive. 
Private consumption will be stimulated by expan-
sionary fiscal policy. For instance, whereas pen-
sions fell back relative to wages in recent years, they
are scheduled to increase substantially this year. As
a downside of these measures, the public finance
situation has already worsened substantially last
year –the budget deficit rose to 7 percent of GDP in
the first half of 2009 as compared to a surplus of a
similar magnitude the year before. It is bound to
deteriorate further, albeit at a slower pace. Parts of
the deficit are and will be financed by withdrawals
from the stabilisation fund that is fed by raw mate-
rial proceeds. Its size, however, is shrinking quickly.
Whereas it amounted to 16.2 percent of GDP on
average in 2008, it was only 12.7 percent in Au-
gust 2009.
1.3.5 Assumptions, risks and uncertainties 
This forecast rests on the technical assumption that
oil price will move around 75 US dollars per barrel
and the euro exchange rate stabilises at around
1.45 US dollars. World trade is expected to increase
by 5.0 percent this year, after having dropped by
11.0 percent in 2009.
Although the banking crisis appears to be under con-
trol and the world economy is slowly recovering,
uncertainty about economic prospects remains high.
Whereas the maximum spread between forecasts of
(approximately 25) different institutes in the US, as
measured by its 95 percent confidence interval, has
been around 70 basis points for the years 2005 until
2007, it increased to approximately a 100 and
150 basis points for 2008 and 2009, respectively. For
2010 the largest amount of uncertainty amongst pro-
fessional forecasters was registered in early 2009; the
spread even reached 185 basis points (see Figu-
re 1.33). In the latest data we have seen a reduction to
96 basis points, which is historically still large. For the
euro area a similar picture emerges, albeit its peak
with respect to the forecast disagreement for 2010 was
in August 2009.
In our forecast the economies of industrialised
countries and especially the US will only recover
slowly. However, several leading indicators have
improved substantially in recent months. In our
view, besides the technical problems with many of
these survey-based indicators mentioned in Section,
this is largely due to the extraordinarily expansion-
ary economic policies carried out by government
and monetary authorities around the world. Its
stimulus impact could be much stronger if the mul-
tipliers are bigger than we expect. In that case, theprivate economies would not only stabilise but also
go into a sustainable and self-supporting upswing. 
Furthermore, our US scenario is based upon the idea
that private consumption will have to remain subdued
until structural problems of the US economy are
overcome. If, on the other hand, US consumers do
not increase their saving rates by as much as we
assume, the US economy might perform – from a
business cycle perspective – better than expected. By
bringing our US forecast closer to what is currently
the consensus, this would also uplift our forecast for
the rest of the world.
However, there is also the risk that the world economy
will slip into recession again especially if the credit
supply by banks should be restricted more and longer
than expected. This would above all happen when
capital ratios of banks continue to
erode as a consequence of further
massive write-offs. According to
calculations of the IMF (2009), still
pending write-offs continue to
jeopardise financial market stabili-
ty. The fragility of financial mar-
kets became apparent at the end of
last year as seen by the reaction of
stock markets to financial difficul-
ties in Dubai and Greece. An inten-
sification of the banking crisis as a
result of other shocks could send
financial markets into a downward
spiral. This would undoubtedly
have negative consequence on the
world economic climate.
Another risk for the world econo-
my lies in the challenge for policy-
makers to reverse their expansion-
ary course appropriately. Phasing
out expansionary policy should
ideally occur when the economy –
in particular private domestic de-
mand – has stabilized and is able to
revive gradually without further fis-
cal or monetary impulses. However,
if governments decide to cut back
their stimulus measures too early,
many economies would fall back
into recession. This holds both for
monetary policy as well as fiscal
policy. The latter could be tempted
to limit the massive expansion of
budget deficits by introducing consolidation measures
too quickly. Indeed, also waiting too long before
reducing stimulus measures contains considerable
risks; it could easily cause a drop in confidence in the
sustainability of monetary and fiscal policy. Should
central banks maintain their expansionary course
much longer, this could lead to an increase in inflation
expectations. Also the likelihood that a new bubble
emerges somewhere in financial markets would be
high as a result of a persistent increase in liquidity.
Already now it cannot be ruled out that the recovery
on financial markets is unsustainable.
For fiscal policy, high public deficits could also result
in a credibility problem by which the room to
manoeuvre would be seriously limited. In case gov-
ernments do not succeed in communicating their con-
solidation efforts credibly, this would seriously reduce
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trust and lead to an increase of
the capital market interest rates.
This would, in turn, increase the
interest burden of public finance. 
1.3.6 The European economy
The cyclical situation
The deep economic recession has
moved from a stabilisation phase
mid-2009 into a moderate recov-
ery. Coming from historical lows,
consumer and producer confi-
dence are on the mend and point-
ing upward. The recovery is like-
ly to continue in the coming
quarters. It is still doubtful
though whether it will turn into a
self-supporting upswing. Several
restraining factors remain. Credit
supply is bound to become more
restrictive also because the past
recession will for the time being
continue to create additional
write-offs. Capacity utilisation
rates will – after their severe drop
during the crisis – only slowly
move away from their historically
low levels. Consequently, the situ-
ation on the labour market will
continue to deteriorate. Hence, as
soon as stimulus measures and
impulses from the inventory cycle
wear off, the European Union is
likely to fall back to a phase of
low growth. After having sunk by
4.0 percent last year, GDP will
rise to 1.0 percent this year (see
Figure 1.34).
Of the demand components, only
gross fixed capital formation will
continue to contribute negatively
to economic growth this year (see
Figure 1.35). Investments will
first continue to fall, but during
the course of the year increase
moderately. A combination of
low profits, tougher financing
conditions and low growth pros-
pects will continue to put a bur-
den on firms’ willingness to in-
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equipment investment is likely to
pick up somewhat during the
year, the large fall in 2009 will
prevent annual rates from turn-
ing positive. Despite the first
signs of stabilisation on housing
markets, residential investment
continues to shrink, albeit at a
slower pace. Also non-residential
construction will continue to
report negative growth. Stimulat-
ed by fiscal measures, only infra-
structure investment will show
moderate growth this year. 
A relatively strong impulse will
come from investment in invento-
ries. Whereas during the crisis the speed at which
inventories were emptied out was extraordinary (to
increase firm liquidity), it was also clear that this
process was not sustainable. In the meantime invento-
ries are still falling, albeit at a slower pace. Already the
reduction in the rate of decline is creating a positive
impulse for economic growth. The decline in invento-
ries is bound to turn into an increase. Therefore, the
positive impulses will remain during the first half of
this year. Once inventories have been restored, their
cyclical influence is likely to diminish again.
The largest demand component, i.e. private con-
sumption, will deliver only a small positive contribu-
tion to economic growth in the European Union. It
will expand only moderately as a result of the pre-
carious situation on the labour market and the
reduced real wage growth. Lower nominal wage
growth together with moderately
increased inflation rates will
suppress developments in real
disposable income. 
Stronger growth in emerging
markets together with moderate
developments within the Euro-
pean Union will allow net ex-
ports to contribute positively
again to overall growth, thereby
increasing the prevailing trade
account surplus again after its
shrinkage last year. Both ex-
ports and imports will grow,
albeit the latter at a somewhat
slower pace. 
Employment, sectoral output and inflation
On account of its lagging characteristics with respect
to the business cycle, the labour market situation will
further deteriorate in Europe. After having declined
by a – considering the depth of the crisis – moderate 
1.9 percent last year, the number of employees will
continue to decrease by another 1.4 percent this year
(see Figure 1.36). As a near mirror-image, the unem-
ployment rate will continue to rise reaching an average
of 10.3 and 9.9 percent in the euro area and the
European Union, respectively (see Figure 1.37). 
Developments of individual sectors throughout the
crisis have been quite different. Their prospects also
vary substantially. Fiscal stimulus packages almost
always have – for political reasons – a focus on domes-
tic markets. Although the economic crisis mainly
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evolved within the export-ori-
ented manufacturing and the
domestic-oriented construction
sectors, to a large extent only the
latter could benefit from sup-
portive government actions. As
the turn-around in international
trade seems to have been accom-
plished, this is, however, less
clear for construction invest-
ment in Europe. Nevertheless,
fiscal stimulus measures are
bound to fade out, not least
because of the sharply deterio-
rated public finance situation in
many countries. This suggests
that there will be a relative shift
of economic problems away
from the export-oriented sectors
towards the domestic economy
and in particular the construc-
tion sector. 
This is further supported by
consumer behaviour. Whereas
in some European countries
consumption was able to act as
a buffer during the crisis, labour
market and income develop-
ments are likely to suppress
that. As a consequence, and
given that emerging markets are
continuing to develop, export-
oriented sectors are likely to
regain some of their growth,
whereas those that focus more
on the US and EU consumers
will suffer the aftermath of the
economic crisis.
The increase in prices will all together accelerate
somewhat, but – given low capacity utilisation rates
and stable inflation expectations – remain restrained.
The increase in consumer prices will be 1.2 percent in
the European Union in 2010 (after 0.8 percent last
year). In the euro area, the inflation rate will equal
0.9 percent in 2010 (after 0.3 percent last year).
Differences in output growth within Europe
Economic developments in Germany remain subdued
in a historical perspective – albeit above the EU aver-
age (see Figure 1.38). Although endogenous business
cycle forces are gaining strength, the impact of eco-
nomic stimulus measures will gradually fade.
Furthermore, credit constraints will increase and
labour market conditions deteriorate. The German
economy remains weak and a self-supporting upswing
is not obvious.
Given world economic developments, German ex-
ports will only grow moderately. Together with weak
domestic developments, imports will show a similar
profile and the external balance will only marginally
contribute to economic growth. Machinery and
equipment investments will only rise a little as capac-
ity utilisation rates are still low and financial con-
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of degressive depreciation schemes might lead to a
short and temporary uplift in investment activity.
For the time being, infrastructure investments will
continue to benefit from the fiscal stimulus mea-
sures. However, construction of commercial build-
ings will show negative growth this year. At the
beginning of this year, disposable income and hence
private consumption have received an impulse as
child benefits and tax exemption for dependent chil-
dren have been increased. However, this will only
temporarily increase dynamics. Furthermore, car
sales will drop further as the car scrappage scheme
has ended. The savings rate remains high in view of
labour market uncertainty and stagnant economic
developments. Real GDP will increase by 1.6 percent
this year.
Leading indicators in the United Kingdom give a pos-
itive but still restrained picture with respect to the
recovery of private consumption and investment.
Consumer confidence and the business climate have
improved during the last months. However, they
remain below their long-term averages. In spite of
expansionary monetary policy, credit supply of banks
remains restrictive largely because banks’ balance
sheet problems have still not been fully solved. This
puts a burden on the recovery of residential and non-
residential investments and purchases of durable con-
sumption goods. Another restraint on private con-
sumption is the high unemployment rate, which aver-
aged 7.8 percent last year. Because labour productivi-
ty has fallen sharply, the unemployment rate is bound
to increase further. It is estimated to reach 9.2 percent
this year, on average. On the other hand, real-estate
markets appear to have stabilised on account of bet-
ter loan conditions and a somewhat positive wealth
effect. All together the British economy will only
slowly recover. Improved export possibilities due to
the weak pound and the recovery of the world econo-
my will allow the United Kingdom to enter into a sta-
bilisation phase in which GDP will grow by 1.0 per-
cent this year. The inflation rate will remain near its
target value of 2 percent.
For the economic development in France, the
increase of government consumption will be decisive
during the first part of the year. Hence, the French
economy will initially be able to revive itself,
although business cycle prospects remain mixed.
Industrial production has risen recently and also
leading indicators have once more improved largely
on account of positive expectations. However, the
labour market situation has continuously deteriorat-
ed. Furthermore, capacity utilisation rates remain at
historically low levels after having fallen deeply at the
beginning of last year. The initial increase of GDP
might level out in the course of the year as a result of
the phasing out of economic stimulus measures.
Overall GDP will rise by 1.6 in 2010.
The Italian economy will continue to suffer from its
low degree of competitiveness and therefore only
marginally benefit from the recovery of world
demand. Although the manufacturing industry has so
far carried out a number of substantial restructuring
measures which have led to a relative improvement in
particular with respect to product quality, within the
scope of this restructuring many firms depend on
credit supply and therefore currently face two prob-
lems: A more restrictive credit supply by banks and at
the same time the weakness of domestic and foreign
demand. This year, production will recover only slow-
ly. GDP in Italy will increase by 0.5 percent. The
strongest positive impulses will come from private
consumption. In addition, tax breaks on machinery
and equipment investments are scheduled until the
end of June. This will temporarily reduce the fall in
investment. The slow recovery of the world economy
will strengthen Italian exports.
The sharp decline in house prices and construction
activity, the resulting substantial rise in unemploy-
ment, its weak international competitiveness and the
scheduled restraint in fiscal policy will altogether
constrain economic development in Spain during
our forecasting horizon. The high unemployment
rate, reaching 20 percent on average this year, will
decrease wage income and thereby dampen private
consumption. Furthermore, the risk of unemploy-
ment will encourage precautionary savings. The
large number of unsold houses remains a consider-
able burden on the construction sector. Hence, a
continuation of the recession is to be expected. Real
GDP will decrease by 0.5 percent this year (after a
3.7 percent decline in 2009). 
The consequences of the worldwide economic reces-
sion will retard economic recovery in the central and
eastern European region more than in other regions in
the world. Although, with the help of international
financial institutions, a breakdown of financial and
economic systems has been prevented, the necessary
adaptations to the new situation are still on the agen-
da. A return to credit-based growth financed by for-
eigners seems unlikely in the years to come. Domestic
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demand will remain weak in view of rising unemploy-
ment rates, reduced tax receipts, and the pressure to
consolidate public finances. Altogether, GDP of the
region will only grow by 1 percent this year. Caused
by persistent, although weak, consumption growth,
the two largest central and eastern European Union
member countries, the Czech Republic and Poland,
will be able to outperform the others and grow faster
than the EU average. Especially the recessions in the
three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
will remain deep.
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Table e A.1 1 
GDP P growth, , inflation n and d unemployment t in n various s countries





in% 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
EU27 34.0 0.8 –   4.0 1.0 3.5 0.8 1.2 7.0 9.0 9.9
Euro Area 25.1 0.6 –   4.0 1.0 3.3 0.3 0.9 7.6 9.4 10.3
Switzerland 0.9 1.8 –   2.0 1.1 2.4 – 0.5 0.5 3.5 3.8 4.4
Norway 0.8 2.1 –   1.4 2.0 3.8 2.4 1.7 2.5 3.5 3.7
Western and Central
Europe 35.8 0.9 –   3.9 1.0 3.5 0.8 1.2 6.9 8.8 9.7
US 26.7 0.4 –   2.4 2.4 3.8 – 0.4 1.6 5.8 9.2 9.5
Japan 9.1 – 0.7 –   5.3 1.0 1.4 – 1.3 – 0.4 4.0 5.3 5.8
Canada 2.8 0.4 –   2.4 2.2 2.4 0.3 1.6 6.1 8.3 8.7
Industrialised 
countries total 74.4 0.5 –   3.5 1.6 3.3 0.1 1.2 6.1 8.4 9.1
Newly industrialised 
countries
Russia 3.1 5.6 –   8.0 1.5 ·  · · · · · 
China and Hongkong 8.4 8.7 7.8 8.5 ·  · · · · · 
India 2.2 7.3 6.1 6.8 ·  · · · · · 
East India
a) 5.0 3.0 –   1.5 3.5 ·  · · · · · 
Latin America
b) 6.9 3.7 –   2.2 3.1 ·  · · · · · 
Newly industrialised 
countries total 25.6 5.8 1.2 5.1 ·  · · · · · 
Total
c) 100.0 1.8 –   2.3 2.5 ·  · · · · · 
World trade, volume – – – 11.0 5.0 ·  · · · · · 
a) Weighted average of Indonesia. Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. Weighted with the
2006 GDP levels in US dollars. – 
b) Weighted average of Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Peru,
Venezuela. Weighted with the 2006 GDP levels in US dollars. – 
c) Sum of the listed groups of countries. Weighted
with the 2008 GDP levels in US dollars.. – 
d)Standardised unemployment rate.
Source: EU; OECD; IMF; National Statistical Offices; 2009 and 2010: forecasts by the EEAG.EEAG Report 2010 45
Chapter 1
Table e A.3 3 
Key y forecast t figures s for r the e euro o area
2007 2008 2009 2010
Percentage change over previous year
Real gross domestic product 2.7 0.6 –   4.0 1.0
  Private consumption 1.5 0.4 –   1.0 0.4
  Government consumption 2.3 2.0 2.4 1.7
  Gross fixed capital
formation 4.7 – 0.5 – 10.0 – 1.5
  Net exports
a) 0.4 0.0 –   1.0 0.4
Consumer prices
b) 2.1 3.3 0.3 0.9
Percentage of nominal gross domestic product
Government fiscal balance – 0.6 – 2.0 –   6.4 – 7.0
Percentage of labour force
Unemployment rate
c) 7.5 7.6 9.4 10.3
a) Contributions to changes in real GDP (percentage of real GDP in previous
year). – 
b) Harmonised consumer price index (HCPI). – 
c) Standardised un-
employment rate.
Source: Eurostat; 2009, 2010 and 2010: forecasts by the EEAG.
Table e A.2 2 







in% 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
Germany 20.0 1.3 –  5.0 1.6 2.8 0.2 0.6 7.3 7.5 7.9
France 15.6 0.4 – 2.3 1.6 3.2 0.1 0.8 7.9 9.6 10.2
Italy 12.6 – 1.0 – 4.8 0.5 3.5 0.8 1.1 6.8 7.7 8.8
Spain 8.7 0.9 – 3.7 – 0.5 4.1 – 0.3 0.9 11.4 18.5 20.0
Netherlands 4.8 2.0 – 4.0 1.3 2.2 1.0 1.2 2.8 3.5 5.0
Belgium 2.8 1.0 – 3.1 1.1 4.5 0.0 1.1 7.0 8.0 9.1
Austria 2.3 2.0 – 3.3 1.4 3.2 0.4 1.0 3.9 4.6 5.7
Greece 1.9 2.0 – 1.0 – 0.4 4.2 1.3 1.5 7.7 9.6 11.0
Finland 1.5 1.0 – 6.5 0.7 3.9 1.6 1.4 6.4 8.3 9.5
Ireland 1.5 – 3.0 – 7.0 – 0.7 3.1 – 1.7 – 0.3 6.0 12.0 13.6
Portugal 1.3 0.0 – 3.3 0.6 2.6 – 0.9 1.2 7.8 9.7 10.6
Slovakia 1.3 6.2 – 5.0 1.5 3.9 0.9 1.9 9.5 11.6 12.3
Slovenia 0.3 3.5 – 7.0 1.3 5.6 0.9 1.7 4.4 5.9 6.8
Luxembourg 0.3 0.0 – 3.5 1.4 4.1 0.0 1.6 4.9 6.3 7.6
Cyprus 0.1 3.6 – 0.7 1.5 4.4 0.2 2.3 3.6 5.4 6.1
Malta 0.0 2.1 – 2.0 1.6 4.7 1.9 2.0 6.0 7.2 9.0
Euro o area
c) 74.2 0.6 – – 4.0 1.0 3 3.3 0.3 0.9 7.6 9.4 10.3
United Kingdom 14.6 0.5 – 4.6 1.0 3.7 2.1 1.6 5.6 7.8 9.2
Sweden 2.6 – 0.2 – 4.6 1.4 3.4 1.9 2.0 6.3 8.4 9.1
Denmark 1.9 – 0.9 – 4.4 1.0 3.6 1.1 1.5 3.4 5.9 6.4
EU U 19
c) 93.3 0.6 – – 4.1 1.0 3 3.3 0.6 1.0 7.1 9.0 10.0
Poland 2.9 5.0 1.3 2.2 4.2 4.0 2.5 7.1 8.2 8.5
Czech Republic 1.2  2.5 – 4.3 1.5 6.3 0.6 1.6 4.4 6.5 7.2
Romania 1.1 7.3 –  7.3 0.7 7.9 5.6 3.3 5.8 7.0 8.1
Hungary 0.8 0.6 – 6.6 – 0.5 6.1 4.0 3.8 7.8 9.8 10.6
Lithuania 0.3 2.8 – 16.0 – 4.2 11.1 4.2 2.0 5.9 14.5 17.0
Bulgaria 0.3 6.0 – 5.3 – 0.1 12.0 2.5 2.7 5.6 7.0 8.1
Latvia 0.1 – 4.6 – 18.0 – 4.5 15.3 3.3 4.2 7.5 18.1 20.0
Estonia 0.1 – 3.6 – 13.5 – 3.0 10.6 0.2 1.2 5.6 14.5 16.5
EU U 8 6.7 4.1 – – 3.5 0.9 6.3 3.5 2.6 6.5 8.6 9.4
EU U 27
c) 100.0 0.8 – – 4.0 1.0 3.5 0.8 1.2 7.0 9.0 9.9
a) Harmonised consumer price index (HCPI). – 
b) Standardised unemployment rate. – 
c) Sum of the listed countries.
Source: EUROSTAT; OECD; IMF; 2008, 2009, 2010: forecasts by the EEAG.A Ap pp pe en nd di ix x   2 2: :
I If fo o   W Wo or rl ld d   E Ec co on no om mi ic c   S Su ur rv ve ey y   ( (W WE ES S) )
The Ifo World Economic Survey (WES) assesses
worldwide economic trends by polling transnational
as well as national organisations worldwide about cur-
rent economic developments in the respective country.
This allows for a rapid, up-to-date assessment of the
economic situation prevailing around the world. In
2009, 1,026 economic experts in 88 countries were
polled. WES is conducted in co-operation with the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris.
The survey questionnaire focuses on qualitative infor-
mation: on assessment of a country’s general eco-
nomic situation and expectations regarding important
economic indicators. It has proved to be a useful tool,
since economic changes are revealed earlier than by
traditional business statistics. The individual replies
are combined for each country without weighting.
The “grading” procedure consists in giving a grade of
9 to positive replies (+), a grade of 5 to indifferent
replies (=) and a grade of 1 to negative (–) replies.
Grades within the range of 5 to 9 indicate that posi-
tive answers prevail or that a majority expects trends
to increase, whereas grades within the range of 1 to 5
reveal predominantly negative replies or expectations
of decreasing trends. The survey results are published
as aggregated data. The aggregation procedure is
based on country classifications. Within each country
group or region, the country results are weighted
according to the share of the specific country’s
exports and imports in total world trade.
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